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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JOSEPH GERALD MACD·ONALD,
Respondent and Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No.

7665
VERA CATHERINE MACDONALD
Appellant and Defendant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is not satisfied with appellant's statement of facts, and here m·akes a brief chronological resume of the evidence in the belief it will be of ·considerable aid to the court. References in this statement of
facts are to plaintiff and defendant, who are the respondent and appellant, respectively.
Joseph Gerald MacDonald, the plaintiff, and Vera
C. MacDonald, the defendant, were married on June
15, 1922 in ·Oakland, California (R 45). In 1927 the
parties moved to Los Gatos, California, for a year ~and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a half and then returned to Oakland, and in December
of 1930 they took up residence in Sacramento (R 76).
The plaintiff came to Salt Lake City on November 15,
1945, and was joined by defendant s-ome months later.
In October, 1946, they purchased their home at 998
South 15th East (R 45). The defendant had three miscarriages preceding the birth of their present child,
Barbara, who was born in Oakland in 1925 (R 77, 78),
and is now an adult in a convent (R 45, 79), and not a
·dependent (R. 108).
During this period and for the last thirty years
plaintiff has been employed by the Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul & Pacific Railroad· Company (R 55). His employment required him to work away from home on the
road, except for S~aturdays and Sundays (R 46). He
is at p-resent its General Agent in Salt Lake City (R 45).
Defendant first started drinking to excess in 1941,
four years prior to coming to Salt L'ake. At that time
the period between drinking bouts was ten days to a
week and after the parties came to Salt Lake defendant began drinking continuously (R 46). The situation became more aggravated in 1947 and still worse
in 1948 and 1949. During the latter period of the marriage, the defendant would drink for two or three
weeks, until nausea ted; then, after the period of nausea
had passed, immediately start ·drinking 'again (R 48,
49, 95, 96). The defendant would wake plaintiff during
the nights by pounding on his belly, screaming at the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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top of her voice, kicking the door to his bedroom if he
closed and locked it (R 51). She acted generally as a
wild person while under the influence of intoxicants (R
68). During 1948 'and 1949, plaintiff frequently stayed
away from home at night in order to get his sleep (R
106).
Plaintiff an,d defendant are ·members of the Catho..
lie Church. In 1946 the plaintiff sought help from
Father LaBranch, his Priest, and also consulted with
Dr. Walker. Dr. Walker recommended the defendant
be taken to the Mountain View Sanitarium in Salt Lake
City and the wife entered willingly (R 46, 47)~ The
defendant was in the sanitarium ·on two occasions during this year and remained there about three or four
weeks (R 64, 65). While there she got hold of some
whiskey and caused a disturbance and attempted to
cut her throat (R 47, 48). The defendant was taken to
the County Hospital after cutting ·herself and there'after was taken to the State Mental Hospital where she
remained ·for thirty days. She was subsequently released and returned to the parties' home (R 65, 66). In
February of 1948, the plaintiff left the ·defendant and
filed an action for divorce. He did this only after consulting with his Priest, who was thoroughly apprised
of the situation, and because he was unable to rest. and
do his work properly (R 50, 113). The action was dismissed with prejudice on plaintiff's motion on the lOth
of May, 1948 (R 63, 113). After dismissing the complaint, the plaintiff returned home and lived with deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fenda:p.t until October, 1949. The defendant had stated
that she would stop drinking, but after the parties resumed living together the defendant began drinking
again (R 69, 70).
The defendant was, in June 1949, committed to the
State Mental Hospital for 30 days observation upon
the plaintiff's affidavit and after he·aring. (Insanity
Record 6088, R 114, '66-67). There was at that time,
however, no psychosis (R 110). This action was taken
by the plaintiff after consulting with Dr. Walker and
Msgr. McGuire (R 49, 67), 'and during a period when
defendant had been drinking heavily (R 74). The plaintiff visited the defendant at the hospital on Sundays
and she seemed perfectly normal. She was released
sometime in July 1949 without plaintiff's knowledge
and commenced drinking immediately (R 49-50, 70).
After the defendant was released from the State Mental Hospital, plaintiff and defendant lived together at
their home in Salt Lake, but plaintiff did not have marital relations with defendant and had not had such relations for approximately five years. The parties occupied separate bedrooms (R 68). Plaintiff did not
forgive defendant for her drinking. From the summer
of 1949 he tolerated the drinking and did no more than
live with her and attempt to get her to stop drinking
(R 70-71-72).
Plaintiff left defendant in October of 1949, and
lived elsewhere, but he attempted a further reconciliaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion at Thanksgiving time in November of 1949. His
attempt was unsuccessful because ·defendant got drunk
(R 50-51).
On January 1950, plaintiff filed his complaint for
divorce commencing this action (R 1).
Plaintiff testified that he has been to celebrations
at the clubs he has joined (see below) where it is a
mixed party, and that he has had drinks with a particular female; that he has taken this particular woman
to parties and that he has seen her several times a
month; that their relationship is one of companionship
(R 101). Plaintiff has been to her apartment where she
lives with a daughter and a son; she and her daughter
have been to plaintiff's apartment for dinner, ~and there
have been occasions when she has come to plaintiff's
apartment with him; he gave her a Christmas present
(R 103). Plaintiff stated this acquaintanceship has
existed for about a year prior to date of trial (R 102,
104).
The testimony and exhibits introduced on the trial
of this case show the parties' financial condition as follows: That plaintiff and defendant have acquired a
home and lot at 998 South 15th East, Salt Lake City,
Utah, for which they paid $15,000.00 on O·ctober 1, 1946,
and that within 90 days of the trial of this cause an
offer had been made of $13,500.00, which had been rejected by the plaintiff (R 53). The plaintiff testified
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that this house, except for minor repairs, was in good
condition (R 94). Against the home of the parties is an
indebtedness of $6,000.00, ·secured by a mortgage to the
First Security Bank of Utah. The parties have also
acquired household furnishings in their home of a reasonable value of $2,000.00 (R 56, 84-85). They have acquired a 1949 Hudson two-door sedan of the value of
$1400.00, against which there is a lien of $212.80 (R 88,
54).
As their individual property: The wife received
during 1950 ;as an inheritance $8,000.00, of which she
has $6948.25 on deposit at Walker Bank & Trust Company (R 55, Pl. Ex. 1), and the wife has an expectancy
fr·om her mother's estate; her mother being at the time
of the trial 82 years of age ( R 56). The plaintiff has
no bank account or property other than the car and is
in fact under the following indebtedness: He owes
$200.00 to his sister for personal loan and he owes
$135.75 to the Continental National Bank & Trust Company (R 53-54}.
Plaintiff testified that his gross earnings are $481.00
per month, out of which are ·made a -compulsory deduction of $18.00 per month for railroad retirement,
and a deduction for income taxes, reducing his income
to $387.56 per month (R 52). That the only income he
has to live on is his salary (R 54). Plaintiff states that
his work is the solicitation of business from shippers
and receivers for his railroad in competition with other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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railroads; that his area includes Wyoming, Oregon,
eastern Nevada, Utah and Idaho and that he has an expense account when on the road to cover actual expenses (R 58). This expense account is a maximum of
$150.00 per month and covers meals, lodging and car
expenses (R 81-82). His car expen·ses would be $48.00
to $50.00 per month at six cents per mile (R 82). He
further testified that he is living in an apartment, eats
at hotels and restraurants (R 59), and his .meals ·cost
him approximately $90.00 per month (R 83). He pays
rent of $54.00 per month and utilities of $10.00 to $12.00
per month (R 85). He pays $35.00 to $40.00 p·er month
for clothes and approximately $15.00 for tobacco, liquor,
etc. Plaintiff testified that the nature of his business
is such that he must do entertaining not covered by
company expenses and that he must belong to certain
clubs and social organizations in connection with his
business (R 55, 58, 59, 83). He further testified th·at he
is required to have an automobile in his business (R 52).
Plaintiff testified that he had been paying $125.00
per month temporary alimony since the filing of an
order to show cause (R 53). That he had been paying
in addition $74.31 on the house loan, except for five
months, which total of $378.95 he acknowledges he now
owes to the defendant (R 53, 61, 107). He may optionally retire at the age of sixty and is required to retire
at the age of sixty-five, and that his retirement pay,
based .on his average earnings, during a particular
period, would be approximately $125.00 or $126.00 per
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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month (R 60).
Plaintiff testified that the expenses
the house heretofore mentioned would be
$3.54 for telephone and approximately
for the gas throughout the year (R 86),
gage payments.

in maintaining
$1.75 for light,
$5.00 average
plus the mort-

The plaintiff stated that he is now in good health,
that he is 54 years of age and that he does not know
at this time whether or not he will retire at 60 or 65 (R
89). That his wife is in good health when she is not
drinking and she has had three physical examinations
which indicated she was in good physical condition, except for her addiction to drink (R 107). He testified
that his wife is 59 years of age (R 104).
Based upon the foregoing facts in evidence, the
trial court made the following findings of fact: That
for a period of approximately four years defendant
has been habitually addicted to the use of intoxicating
beverages and is an habitual drunkard; that defendant
has periods when she is perfectly competent to act for
herself and is in possession of all her faculties; that defendant is competent to be sued in this action without appointment of a guardian; plaintiff has at no time forgiven
nor condoned defendant's habitual drunkenness; that
plaintiff has not treated defendant cruelly and he lives
apart from her with just cause and because of defendant's
fault; that the parties own a home worth $13,000.00
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-against which is a lien of $6,000.00 and which, on sale,
should pay $7,000.00 net proceeds; that the furnishings
of said home are 'vorth $2,000.00 and defendant has as
her own funds $6,947.:25; that plaintiff earns $481.80
per month before dedu-ctions and has no other funds or
income; that it \Yould be fit and proper to award defendant the home and its furnishings, less one or two
specified items, a nominal alimony and attorney's fees;
that plaintiff should be awarded a divorce as provided
by law and should be awarded the 1949 Hudson automobile; that should defendant's financial position become such that she is in danger of becoming a public
charge, the duty of support should fall upon plaintiff
(R 10, 11, 12).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to
Make More Definite and C·ertain were properly denied.
2. The Findings of F'a.ct and Conclusions of Law
are in conformity with the evidence and are supported
in law. Plaintiff was p-roperly awarded a divorce; the
awards of property and alimony are proper.
3. Defendant did not prevail on her ~defense nor
on her Cross Complaint for separate maintenance or
divorce.
4. D·efendant was responsible for her misconduct
and it was proper that she be sued without a guardian.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
Counsel for the R·espondent answers the points
•and aguments of Appellant in a slightly different order
than as presented in appellant's brief. Respondent proceeds upon the premise that those points set forth in the
index to Appellant's brief which are not argued, are
abandoned, but all points argued by Appellant are
·answered herein.
POINT 1. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MOTION TO MAKE MO·RE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN
WERE PRO;PERLY DENIED. (Appellant's Arguments (A) and
(B).)

(a) The Complaint need not have been verified.
The Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part :
''Except when otherwise specifically provided
by rule, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit."
This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in
conformity with the provisions of 20-2-4.10 U. C. A.
1943, which is not a delegation of legislative power, but
an acknowledgment by the State Legislature of the inherent authority of the courts to control matters of procedure by court rule. This statute provides that upon
the adoption of appropriate . rules of procedure, all
statutes in conflict therewith shall be of no further force
and effect. Appellant's cases on the unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to another branch
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the state government are not in point.. If the Supreme
Court, by rule, had attemped to enumerate the grounds
for divorce, substantive rights of litigants would have
been affected, but the rule deals only with the form of
the pleading asserting such a cause of action.
There can be no doubt that Rule 11, as adopted,
was intended to reach the provisions of 40-3-4. The
court is asked to consider the Federal Rule, from which
has been deleted the words ''or statute'' which follow
the phrase ''Except when otherwise specifically provided
oy rnle .... '' By leaving out the exception and the refr,rence to specific statutes requiring pleadings to be verified, the Supreme Court has obviously intended that the
only exceptions be those set forth in the rules.
In any event, the lack of a verified complaint is
not jurisdictional and can be waived. See Patterson v.
Patte.rson, 190 Pacific 2d 887, 164 Kan. 501. A motion to
dismiss based upon the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause ·of action does not raise the point
(R 4). Further, Appellant's Answer, Cross-Complaint
and Counterclaim are not verified (R 5-8), and this
cause proceeded to judgment without this matter having
been previously presented and argued.

(b) The statement of grounds for divorce was
sufficient and was definite and certain.
Paragraph 4 of Respondent's Complaint sets forth
two grounds for divorce. They are cruelty causing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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great mental distress and habitual drunkenness (R 1).
Upon the trial of the cause he abandoned the ground of
cruelty, he presented no evidence upon this ground except as it was pertinent to the ground of habitual drunkenness, and no findings were made on cruelty (R 10),
nor was the decree of divorce based upon such a ground.
The grounds for divorce as set forth in 40-3-1, subsections 5 and 7, which are habitual drunkenness of the
defendant, and cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the
defendant, are equally brief. Respondent has certainly
pleaded his grounds for divorce with as much certainty
and definiteness as required by the Complaint set forth
in Form 18 of the Appendix of Forms, U. R. C. P. It is
to be noted that these forms are approved as sufficient
under the provisions of Rule 84.
Appellant states that she was not properly apprised
of the comph1.int which ''she should have to meet.'' In
this regard the Federal Courts in construing their Rule
12, have uniformly held that a motion for a more difinite statement should only be granted when the information sought is necessary to frame a responsive pleading
and is not for the purpose of preparing for trial. See
Federal Practice and Procedture, by Barron and Holtzoff, section 362. Any further particulars which defendant may need in order to prepare for trial should be
obtained by depositions, interrogatories, and other discovery procedure. See state cases cited on page 687 of
volume one of the above work. Nearly a year expired
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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between the filing of the complaint and the trial of this
cause (R 1, 24) in which time such information could
have been obtained.
POINT 2. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE EVIDENCE AND ARE SUPPORTED IN LAW. PLAINTIF'F WAS
PROPERLY AWARDED A DIVO·RCE; THE AWARDS OF
PROPERTY AND OF ALIMO:NY ARE PROPER. (Appellant's
Arguments (D , (F) and (H).)

The evidence in this case clearly reveals the tragedy
that occurs when a person becomes a chronic alcoholic.
It also reveals the great patience and conside~ation with
which the defendant met the daily ·difficulties of making a home with defendant. Since 1941 the defendant
had been drinking excessively· (R 46). Plaintiff sought
expert medical help to meet this problem. He sought
the help of his church (R 46-95). He placed the def.en·
dant in a private sanitarium on two occasions and when
defendant appeared to b.e about to injure h~rself she
entered the state mental hospital (R 47, 64), apparently
voluntarily (See Insanity Record 6088, page 1). After
seven years of defendant's excessive drinking, in
February 1948, plaintiff filed for a divorce, but even
then only after asking for the advice and help of his.
priest (R 50, 113). Plaintiff reconsidered, dismissed
his complaint and attempted to make a go of the marriage, but defendant's resumption of her drinking made
this impossible (R 69, 70). Violence to his person and a
period of p·articularly heavy drinking caused plaintiff
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
to doubt his wife's sanity. She was ·committed for a
period of thirty days obs·ervation; during which period
she was dehydrated and acted normally. But again on
her return home · she commenced her drinking. Plaintiff left the defendant in October, 1949, and yet at~
tempted a last reconciliation in N·ovember 1949. During
this entire period defendant's drinking became progressively worse and more impossible to deal with (R
48, 49, 95, 96).
No possible finding of fact other than habitual
drunkenness on the part of defendant could have been
made by the trial ·court. Clearly it is a confirmed habit
satisfying the requirements of the statute. Holm v.
Holm, 139 Pacific 937, 44 Utah 242.
Appellant argues that because plaintiff knew of
defendant's drinking and lived with her after her confinement in a sanitarium and after his filing divorce
1action that he had forgiven her and condoned her chronic
drunkenness and cannot now -complain of it.
It is submitted that forgiveness or condonation are
not made out on the facts of the case. Further, the dismissal of a prior divorce action followed by repeated
misconduct of a defendant does not constitute condonation. Mayo v. Maryo, 43 Pacific 2d 535, 3 California 2d
51. Condonation is conditional upon exemplary future
behavior. Thum v. Thum, 98 Pacific 2d 279, (Colo.),
and the cas·es therein cited. Forgiveness, if this record
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disclosed it, would not bar plaintiff from seeking relief where the defendant's misconduct is resumed, and
the law permits the injured party to ass·ert all the P'rior
misconduct, as well as that occurring subsequent to the
ineffective condonation. Thum v. Thum, supra; Lassen
v. Lassen, 7 Pacific 2d 120, 134 Kan. 436; Burt v. Burt,
72 Pacific 2d 524, 48 Wy.oming 19; Arnold v. Arnold, 174
Pacific 2nd 674, 76 Cal. App. 2d 877.
Apparently neither of the parties had any considerable amount of property at the time of their marriage. The wife at that time was not employed and
lived with her parents (R 77). She brought no property
to the marriage (R 76, 77). The property accu~ulate~
by the parties was purchased from the earnings of pl~ain
tiff, with the exception of two or three hundred dollars
the defendant contributed to the purchase of a home
in Sacramento, California (R 77, 99) which occurred
sometime in the 1930s.
As set forth in the foregoing statement of facts,
the parties have as their joint property, $13,500.00, less
a $6,000.00 mortgage, in a hou8e; $2,000.00 in fuTnishings; $1400.00, less a lien of $212.80, in a ear. Plaintiff has no separate estate. Defendant has $6948.25 on
deposit and a substantial expectancy in her mother's
estate.
The net value of the joint estate as found by the
court is approximately $10,200.00 (h.ouse, car, furnishSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ings). Of this amount, $9,000.00 was awarded to the defendant and $1200.00 to the plaintiff. Combined with
her separate estate the defendant has $16,000.00 in property and cash, approximately.
The plaintiff's net is the $1200.00 in the car and his
net worth is reduced by the amount of the debts he has
accumulated during the period he was paying on the
mortgage and the temporary alimony. In addition to
this, defendant was :awarded attorney's fees of $250.00,
although there was absolutely nothing in the record to
show a need or inability of defendant to pay her own
attorney. Defendant was further awarded a nominal
a~imony for the purpose of placing her future needs,
if any arise, upon plaintiff (R 12-15).
The record discloses that defendant's health is not
good but that she is in good health when not drinking
(R 107). Counsel for appellant asserts in his brief that
she is now in a hospital, but there is no such evidence
before the trial court, and this court should refuse to
consider this matter as the full extent of her disability
and prospects of recovery cannot be ascertained. In
any event, plaintiff concedes that the possibility of defendant becoming gainfully employed is slim if not nonexistent and that the situation is, therefore, not materially changed.
· Plaintiff is employed and e1arning $481.00 gross
per month, after deductions, $387.56 per month (R 52).
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He has expenses per month of meals $90.00, rent $59.00,
utilities $10.00 to $12.00, clothes $35.00 to $40.00, miscellaneous amounts for cigarettes and liquor, etc. $15.00
(R 83, 85) and in addition to this he must make car payments of $53.10 (R 82) for he is required to have a car
(R 52) 'and he has entertainment expenses for which he
is not compensated (R 55, 58, 59. 83). As always there
are amounts paid out which cannot readily be accounted
for which will come out of plaintiff's earnings and there
is the need for plaintiff to pay attorney's fees, the back
alimony ~and the five months back mortgage payments.
The effect of the temporary order for support money
was to take all of plaintiff's savings and reduce him to
the device of getting small loans to meet cuTrent expenses (R 88).
Appellant misstates the record when she asserts
that upon retirement plaintiff will have no income. The
evidence was that he will have an income of $125.00 or
$126.00 per month (R '60) and that he could take other
work at that time if it was not connected with a railroad (R 89). It does not follow that a future need of
the defendant will not he met because of a decrease in
plaintiff's earnings, although his earnings will undoubtedly decline.
A plain inference from the facts and an undoubted
consideration of the trial court was the expense of the
purchase of liquor by defendant for the years of her
excessive drinking (R 89, 90). With plaintiff constantly
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on the road it would have been impossible for him to refuse to give defendant control over some of the family
funds 1and she had a joint checking account (R 46, 89).
The defendant was ·clearly at fault. It is her misconduct, continuing over many years. which has caused
this marriage· to fail. During the latter period of the
marriage the defendant failed completely to perform
her wifely duties ~~.round the parties' home. (R 96, 97).
This court has held that whatever doubt there may be
concerning a property settlement, "it ought to be re .
solved against the guilty party whose fault and wrongs
and breaches of the marital relation destroyed the home
and forced or brought about the separation. Dahlberg
v. Dahlberg, 292 Pacific 214, 77 Utah 137.
Appellant contends that a guilty party may still be
awarded alimony and cites the provisions of 40-3-5 as
opposed to the provisions of 40-3-9, U. C. A. 1943. Respondent has no serious quarrel with the proposition
that in a proper case such an award can be made. It
would be well to consider the cases where the problem
has ·come up. Appellant cites three: Schuste.r v. Schuster,
53 Pacific 2d 428, 58 Utah 257; Woolley v. Woolley, 195
Pacific 2nd 743, 113 Utah 391; Greener v. Greener, 212
P-acific 2nd 194, (Utah).
~Greener

v. ,Greener is not in point. No divorce was
granted in this case and no alimony -awarded. In Schuster
v. Schuster, alimony in the fixed sum of $1500.00 was
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awarded to the plaintiff-wife who was also awarded
the divorce. Obviously under the court decision, she
was not at fault. In Woolley v. Woolley, the defendanthusband was awarded a divorce, the wife was given ap.;.
proximately one-third of the accumulated property and
the trial ·court was ordered to retain jurisdiction so that
the wife could realize her share of the increase in value,
if any, of certain speculative mining interests awarded
to the husband. This latter arrangement could be more
accurately characterized as a property division with
provisions for a future adjustment. It is hardly the
payment of alimony as it is usually understood.
T aking the tests and manner of dividing the p·roperty in the Woolley case, and applying them here, a
division of the net joint estate would result in defendant taking approximately $3400.00 and the plaintiff
$6800.00. The plaintiff only received $1200.00 and the
defendant received $9,000.00 under the decision in thisj
case. Defendant, therefore, received a $5600.00 advantage from the property division. At $100.00 alimony
per month it would be 56 months before she would have
the equivalent; and this does not account for the earnings on the sum she now has the use of for this period.
At $75.00 per month it would be 74% months before
she would receive the equivalent. Undoubtedly the trial
court considered these matters before making the awards
in this case.
1

Under no case or authority in this state is the de-.
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fendant entitled to a majority share of the accumulated
property plus a substantial award of alimony. A fair
division of the property would be as stated in the lWoolley case, supra, at page 745, Pacific Reports:
"In determining generally what a wife is entitled to when a divorce decree has been granted
to the husband, we have considered one-third
as being a fair proposition.''
The difficulty of doing justice between litigants in
a divorce suit as to the division of property and the
awarding of alimony is undoubtedly one of the greatest
problems to ·confront a court, trial or appellate. Each
case must be considered on its own facts. Dahlberg ·v.
Dahlberg, supra; Allen v. Allen, 165 Pacific 2d 872 at
875, 109 Utah 99, and the ·cases and texts therein cited.
Elements to consider ·can be set forth, Pifnion v. Pinion,
67 Pacific 2d 265, 92 Utah 255, but in the final analysis a
solution is dependent upon the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. Though the rule may have once been
otherwise, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for the trial court, and unless there is a clear
abuse of discretion, the lower court's decision will be
affirmed; Anderson v. Anderson, 138 Pacific ~d 252, 104
Utah 104; Allen v. Allen, supra, and cases therein cited.
Appellant raises many arguments as to future contingencies which are highly speculative. The uncertainties, of the effect of a divorce decree upon the litigants,
under future conditions are inherent in any divorce
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action; and this is the reason modification under ch!anged
circumstances is permitted. Further, a court cannot
consider separately any one factor, but must look at the
whole of the case.
A careful consideration of the lower court's decision in this cause reveals that a ·lion's share of the
joint property was awarded to defendant, although she
might well have not been entitled to it; that this award
was made in lieu of any substantial alimony payments;
that the court considered this p-roperty, in addition to
defendant's separate estate, should care for defendant
for a considerable period of time as stated, approximately ten years.
Whether or not the finding of ten years is correct,
the principle is the same, because the court further provided defendant with a nominal alimony to protect her
in future circumstances. The plaintiff, on the other
hand, who has not been at fault, is given a $1200.00 asset, the car, has no further interest in the joint estate,
is saddled with substantial debts, private and under the
decree, and has only his salary left to him. This is what
the plaintiff takes after contributing his all to the miarriage through the twenty-nine years of its existence.
It is ·submitted that the decree is more than fair to defendant.
The trial court having found the foregoing awar,ds:
to be fair, just and equitable, it follows, of course, that
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the Conclusions of Law and the Decree should be in conformity with said Findings, as they are (R 12-15).
POINT 3. DEFENDANT DID NOT PREVAIL ON HER
DEFENSE, NOR ON HER CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR SEPARAT'E MAINTANCE OR DIVORCE. (Appellant's Argument
(E) and (G).)

What respondent has previously stated about the
evidence, and particularly the matters first set forth in
P·oint 2 of his argument 'are applicable here. It is submitted the plaintiff w.as justified in living separate and
apart from defendant and he did so because of her fault.
There is no evidence that he failed to support her, to
·the contrary that he permitted her to draw on his bank
account (R 89, 93) and has paid her temporary alimony
pending trial. The necessary elements set forth in Section 40-4-1 U. C. A. 1943 .providing for ~eparate maintenance were not proved.
Defendant was permitted 'at the. time of trial to
amend her cross complaint to state grounds for a divorce,
though an amended. pleading or written pleading was
not filed and none appears in the record. The evidence
·upon which defendant ·contends she was entitled to a
divorce, 'as we understand it, is that plaintiff signed an
affidavit of insanity against defendant, that he had filed
a prior divorce action, and that during the year preceding the trial of this cause he had 'a companionable relationship with another woman. The evidence on this
latter point is contained in 4 pages of the transcript (R
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101-104), and we submit that there is nothing therein
contained which could be construed as being grounds
for divorce in favor of defendant. Furthermore, there
is no showing that plaintiff ever did anything improper,
or that his conduct caused defendant any distress. And
the entire relationship, such as it is, occurred only after
plaintiff had separated from defendant in November
1949, and had only been in existence for approximately
~a year prior to the date of trial, January 10, 1951 (R
101-104), showing conclusively that it was in no wise the
cause of defendant's long continuing p·rior mis-conduct.
As to the filing of the prior divorce case, a reading
of the record discloses that this was done with great
reluctance and after consultation by plaintiff with his
priest (R 50). There is not a scintill~a of evidence that
the matters therein alleged were false, and undoubtedly
at that time a valid cause of action for ·divorce existed
in plaintiff. He cannot be penalized for exercising a
right that the law gives him.
What has been sa~d of the prior divorce action is
true of the insanity affidavit. The evidence ·clearly
shows that this step was taken in good faith after asking
the advice of the f~amily priest and the defendant's
physician (R 67, 68).
POINT 4. DEFENDANT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
HER MISCONDUCT AND IT WAS PROPER THAT SHE BE
SUED WITHO·UT A GUARDIAN. (Appellant's Arguments (C),
(1), (J), and (K).)
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This 'action was commenced by filing a complaint
on January 19, 1950 (R 1). ·The case was not tried until January 10, 1951 (R 24). During the intervening
p·eriod a hearing was had on an Order to Show Cause,
and the defendant was then present and testified (R
91). At no time during this period did defendant contend she wa;s insane or required a guardian to appear
in this action. The motion for guardian ad litem was
first made on the morning of trial (R 37) but counsel
at that time was more concerned with obtaining her
presence than anything else and first asked for a bench
warrant (R 25, 27, 28). The trial court offered to appoint a guardian ad litem forthwith and proceed with
the trial, but ·counsel for ·defendant wanted the defendant present (R 31), and further urged that the guardian should make a report to the court (R 31, 33). Court
and ·counsel agreed that ·counsel and plaintiff should
go to the family home and see defendant and report to
the court (R 34, 35). As. a consequence, a report was
made to the court that the defendant knew of the hearing, refused to appear, and entrusted her cause to her
lawyer (R 36, 37). Motion for ~a guardian ad litem was
reasserted, resisted on the showing then made, and
denied by the court on the ground that a guardian could
do nothing to protect defendant's interest that couldn't
be accomplished by her counsel (R 37, 38).
1

Prior to the ruling on this motion there were three
matters, in addition to the report of counsel, put before
the trial court. They were the Insanity Record 6088
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(R 30), the stipulation as to Dr. R. A. D~a,rke's testimony (R 34, 110) which was to the effect that at the
tiine he examined defendant and at the hearing before
Judge Ellett there was no evidence of psychosis, and,
third, the representation by counsel for the defendant
that defendant had been absent from the Utah State
Hospital for some time, and had even been out of town
(R 25). The evidence on the hearing of this matter
showed that defendant had been absent from the hospital
for eighteen months following her release and prior to
trial.
The physician's certificate in the Insanity Record
contains the clinical record of the defendant. It shows
that she has no physical defects, that her orientation
is correct, that her memory is good as to recent events.,
her mood is pleasant and coopera,tive, she has no delusions or hallucinations, she is rational, that she is
dangerous to self, and the probable cause of patient's
illness is alcoholic degeneration; on diagnosis there :are
no entries after the various mental diseases, but the
words ''alcohol addiction'' are indieated. Following
the words ''psychosis undiagnosed'' is the term ' 'alcoholism with suicidal tendencies.'' Following this in the
form are the signatures of R. A. Darke and V. M. Sevy,
doctors. It is to be remembered Dr. Darke's testimony,
contained in the stipulation (R 110), was to the effect
that notwithstanding this certificate the p'atient was not
psychotic at the time he examined her. The writer suggests that Dr. Sevy's testimony would have been to the
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same effect. The court found defendant insane and
committed her to the Utah State Hospital for thirtyday observation. It is to be noted that this antiquated
form is made for the p,ermanent commitment of a patient and contains no provision for temporary commitment as provided in Section 85-7-17, U.C.A. 1943, as
amended in 1945, which section does not provide for a
finding of insanity by the District Judge until notification that p'atient is insane by the Medical Superintendent of Utah State Hospital, and provides only for commitment on a thirty-day observation basis. An examination of the form reveals that Judge Ellett made
the insertion that this commitment was ''for 30 day
observation period.''
Also contained in the file is a letter of Owen P.
Heninger, the Medical Superintendent of the Utah State
Hospital, a state officer under the provisions of Section 85-7-11, which letter is addressed to Judge A. H.
Ellett and refers to a prior communication between
these two. This letter st,ates that the defendant was released because no p.sychosis W'as found. The date of
letter referred to is not shown, but the evidence conclusively shows that said release occurred about three
weeks after the commitment (R 67) and that the defendant took up her residence again with plaintiff in
July of 1949 (R 70). There is no question that defendant has lucid intervals of two or three days, as stated
in defendant's brief, when she has drunk to a point of
saturation and is then nauseated ( R 47). There is 1also
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no question that she is completely normal when she
ceases drinking (R. 96). Plaintiff saw her at the Utah
State Hospital on several occasions when she had been
without intoxicants and she was quite normal (R 49,
50).
Section 85-7-17, as amended in 1945, supra, is the
only provision dealing with the judicial commitment of
a person on a temporary b,asis, ,and is undoubtedly the
section the court "\vas acting under in regard to defendant's commitment in June of 1949, as shown by this
record. This section provides:
''Temporary Commitments-Discharge-Further Proceedings.
"Upon the filing of a verified application alleging that a person is in such mental condition
that his commitment to the hospital is necessary
for his proper care or observation, if such person is fonnd by two duly licensed· physicians to
be in such mental condition, he may be committed by any district judge having jurisdiction,
to the hospit~al for a period of thirty days pending the determination of his mental condition.
Within thirty days after such commitment the
superintendent of the hospital shall discharge
him, if he is not insane, and shall so notify the
judge who committed him or, if he is insane, he
shall report the patient's mental condition to the
judge with the recommendation that he be committed as ~an insane person, or discharged to the
care of his guardian, relatives or friends, if he
is harmless and can properly be cared for by
them. Within said thirty days the committing
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judge may authorize a discharge as afores'aid,
or he may commit the patient to the institution as
an insane person, if in his opinion such commitment is necessary. If in the opinion of the
judge additional medical evidence as to the mental condition of the alleged insane person is desirable, he may appoint a physician to further
examine him and report thereon~''
(Italics ours)
As seen above, this statute provides a commitment
for observation for the purpose of determining, in doubtful cases, the mental condition of a patient. The finding of insanity, or lack of ins anity of the patient, is
made by the Medical Superintendent of the Utah State
Hospital. If sane the patient must be discharged. If insane the Superintendent makes his recommendation and
the District Judge acts appropriately under the l~atter
provision of the statute. If no phychosis is found, as is
the fact in the insanity' proceeding under question in
the p-resent case before this court, the Superintendent
shall ''notify'' the judge of that fact. The letter in the
Insanity Record is such notification and clearly shows
that under the above p-rocedure the Medical Superintendent found the defendant sane and diseharged her.
1

It is to be noted that the procedure for definite commitment is provided in Section 85-7-18 and the sections
following and this procedure is entirely different than
that followed in regard to the defendant.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing argument, which we
believe is controlling in this case, if this court concludes
that the commitment of the defendant was on a permanent basis then we submit the following:
That under provisions of 85-7-11, as amended in
1945, the Medical Superintendent has the following duty:
"He shall . . . . -discharge such of them (patients) as, in his judgement are no longer in need
of care and treatment by the hospital staff. He
shall immediately notify the judge of the district from which the patient was committed, the
fact of his discharge. If in the judgment of the
superintendent a patient so discharged has recovered his reason, he shall certify to the judge
of the fact of his recovery, whereupon the judge
shall immediately enter an order restoring the
patient to competency.''
That the letter contained in the Insanity Record is
such a certificate. See Black's Law Dictionary which defines a certificate as follows :
''Certificate. A written assurance, or official
representation, that some act has or has not been
done, or some event occurred, or some legal
formality been complied with.

''A 'certificate' by a public officer is a statement written and signed, but not necessarily or
customarily sworn to, which is by law made evidence of the truth of the facts stated for all or
for certain purposes.
''A writing by which testimony is given that
a fact has or has not taken place.''
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There is no order in the Insanity Record by the
judge, but in the absence of a showing to the contrary,
the judge and the Medical Superintendent are presumed
to have done their official and legal duty. 20 American
Jurisprudence on Evidenc-e, Section 170, and cases there
cited. Legally, therefore, the trial court must have concluded that such an order was made and that the defendant was restored to capacity at the time of her release.
·On the evidence and the law above related, the trial
court in this case should have found that defendant
was sane at all times, and in any event, the trial court
would be compelled to find that the defendant was sane
at the time of her release in July of 1949 and had been
ever smce.
As to defendant's claimed incompetency, other than
the asserted insanity, to be sued in this action, the defendant raises two matters: One that defendant is intoxicated for long periods extending up to three weeks,
and, two, that shortly after the decision in this case,
the defendant was adjudged incompetent to handle her
property because of her habitual drunkenness. Plaintiff petitioned the court for the appointment of a general guardian of the estate of defendant in the belief
that she would very likely squander a large part of her
separate estate, which was cash, and also the proceeds
from the sale of the family home in the event it was sold,
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cause, generally, he felt that she might well be deceived
or imposed upon by artful or designing persons. This
was a step taken for defendant's own benefit. Defendant,
and her counsel here, resisted the appointment of such
general guardian, filing an ans,Yer to plaintiff's petition,
demanding a trial, and contesting the matter at the hearing. The defendant and her counsel at that time and in
that incompetency proceeding took the position that
the defendant 'vas not incompetent; that she was capable
of handling her own separate property, and that she
was not in need of a. guardian of any sort, either of her
person, or her estate, or to represent her in any legal
actions. See Probate File No. 33120, in the Matter of
the Guardianship of the Estate of Vera Catherine MacDonald, and yet, in this proceeding, the defendant has
taken an altogether different stand.
Plaintiff concedes that the defendant is in need of
aid, direction and control of her property and concedes
that she is incompetent to manage and handle it herself, but plaintiff asserts that, notwithstanding the foregoing, it was proper for the defendant to be sued in
the divorce action before this court without the app·ointment of a guardian ad litem. The record shows, as
stated above, that the primary concern of the defendant and her counsel was for defendant to be present
at the trial. There is no way that a guardian ad litem
could as-sure this being done and in the event that a
guardian ad litem had been appointed, the matter would
have proceeded exactly .as it did. It was a contested
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proceeding, with defendant's counsel fully protecting
defendant's rights throughout. The trial court, being
aware of the situation, allowed counsel for the defendant full opportunity to present any matters which he
cared to and permitted a full hearing on the merits of
this case. The only specific proposition which defendant's counsel urged ~as a need for a guardian ad litem
was that such a guardian could make a report to the
court on the possibility of defendant appearing in court
(R 31, 33). The court permitted a recess so that counsel
for both sides eould apprise themselves of this situation
and rep·ort personally to the court in regard to this
matter (R 35). Defendant in her brief fails to state or
put forth any matter that would have been handled differently, or any evidence that would have been put before the court had a guardian been appointed, nor does
she in .any w:ay suggest anything that was done that in
any way, prejudiced her trial in this matter, nor does
she contend that the result would have been otherwise
had a guardian ad litem been present in her behalf.
It does not follow that because defendant is quite
frequently intoxicated that she is incompetent to defend a law suit, although such drunkenness may indicate
she is unable to care for her property. The law recognizes many different degrees of capacity from idiocy,
to :a person insane, to the lack of capacity' to handle
affairs in the competitive business world, to a lack of
capacity to make a testamentary disposition of property,
and so on. Drunkenness does not fall in any of these
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catagories because the status is wilful and voluntary
and can be avoided. And during periods of sobriety the
character of the person is entirely changed. But habitual
drunkenness certainly satifies the provisions of Section
102-13-20, U.C.A. 1943, which provides:
''The "\Yords 'incompetent,' 'mentally incompetent' and 'incap·able,' as used in this title, shall
be construed to mean any person who, though
not insane, is, by reason of old age, disease, weakness of mind, or from amy other cause, unable,
unassisted, to properly manage :and take care
of himself or his property, and by reason thereof
would be likely to be deceived or imp·osed upon
by artful or designing persons." ·
(Italics ours)
The trial of a cause long set should not be postponed
nor should the courts go through idle gestures to protect a person who is voluntarily intoxicated and who,
after notice, deliberately refuses to be present in court,
particularly where such person has adequate representation by an attorney.
In any event, the failure to appoint a guardian ad
litem does not make this proceeding void .and is at most
an irregularity. Neilsen v. 'Emerson, 9 Pacific 2d 260
(Cal.) at page 262. And the subsequent adjudication
of the defendant incompetent does not m·ake the proceeding void. In the case of Sterling v. Goulden,- 12
Pacific 2d 812 (Kans.), wherein the plaintiff was adjudged incompetent a month after judgment was rendered against her, and for whom a guardian was apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pointed to take the appeal, the court held that the judg.
ment was not void and refused to set it aside. It is interesting to note that the basis of the incompetency, as set
forth by the court, was acts and conduct of the party
antedating the trial of the cause in which the judgment
was taken against her, which is the same as in this proceeding.
The general rule in the United States is that a court
has jurisdiction to enter a judgment against an insane
defendant and that the proceeding and judgment are not
void.. 28 American Jurisprudence, Insane and other incompetent persons, Section 103, et seq. Where the validity of the judgment rendered is raised, the courts are
primarily concerned with whether or not the proceeding was open, adverse, devoid of fraud and whether or
not the party's interests were adequately protected and
she was given a fair and impartial trial. 34 American
Law Reports 221, at 223. As to the present case the
court's attention is called to the fact that this was not a
default matter, nor is there any claim of fraud, prejudice or unfairness in the trial.
As we ha.ve stated above, the trial court having properly found the defendent to be sane, it follows that she
must have been responsible for her misconduct. Respondent .agrees with the proposition of law put forth
by appellant, that an insane party cannot be held responsible for misconduct which occurs during the period
of insanity, which would ordinarily give rise to a cause
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of action for divorce, but here there is absolutely no
sho·w-ing that the defendant's drinking started during
a period of insanity, nor that she was insane during
any substantial period of her drinking, if at all, or that
her drinking w·as anything but voluntary. And, of course,
if habitual drunkenness is made a ground for divorce
by the Legislature, as it is, a person guilty of su-ch misconduct cannot assert that she is not responsible for her
habitual drunkenness because she is intoxicated or drunk
or cannot control her drinking.
It, therefore, further follows that the court's Findings and Conclusions in regard to these matters were
proper.

The record in this case discloses that the plaintiff
had a long and trying experience in his attempts to deal
with his wife's .addiction to intoxicants; that he met this
difficulty, which lasted over a period of ten years prior
to trial, with the utmost patience and consideration until
finally the situation became intolerable; and that now
he is deprived of nearly all the accumlation of property
made during the course of the marriage. His conduct
is most unusual in comparison with the usual fact situation coming before the courts in a divorce proceeding
and he endured the conduct of his .spouse long after
many another husband would have given up. The record
further discloses that the awards of family property
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were more than fair to the defendant, that they are substantially greater than would ordinarily he given to a
wife not at fault. That these awards in conjunction
with her separate estate will care for her for a considerable period of time and even if she should have future
needs, she has the right and opportunity to again call
upon plaintiff for a modification of the nominal alimony
award. This case was presented with vigor and resource..
fulness by defendant's counsel and defendant's rights
were fully protected at the trial.
That the judgment and decree of the trial court
should be affirmed is respectfully submitted.

E. C. JENSEN
JOHN H. SNOW
ROBERT JOHN. JENSEN
Attorneys for R:espondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

